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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the State's motion for 
Summary Judgment, because the plain language of Utah Code Ann §63-46b-19(3)(c)(d) 
states, "[I]n a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's order, in addition to any other 
defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend of the ground that: (c) the defendant has 
not violated the order or (d) has violated the order but had subsequently complied. 
The trial court found the Trust was in default on May 9, 1997 and did not give Ms. 
Jensen the opportunity to defend as provided by Utah Code Ann §63-46b-19(3)(c)(d). 
Standard of review: 
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of statutory law 
is correction of error. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,455 (Utah 
1993). 
This issue was preserved for review in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.[Memorandum in 
Support of Objection [DMSO] page 4 paragraph 3]. 
2. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the State's motion for 
Summary Judgment because issues of fact exist as to whether the Trust (1) received adequate 
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notice of the State action; (2) whether such notice properly instructed Ms. Jensen where and 
how to properly respond; and (3) whether Ms. Jensen did in fact request a hearing within the 
time allowed but the request was sent to the wrong party. 
Standard of review: 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A challenge to summary 
judgment involves only review of questions of law in which the appellate court reviews the 
questions for correctness and gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions. The 
appellate court addresses (1) whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and 
(2) whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. 
Glencore. Ltd. v. Ince. 343 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,10 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved for review in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in oral argument 
before the trial court. [DMSO 4:2] [Transcript of Summary Judgment [TSJ] page 8 line 17-
18]. 
3. The trial court erred as a matter of law during the penalty hearing in adopting 
the State's application of the Utah Administrative Code, Air Quality Rules 307-4-1 et seq.. 
In particular the Appellant argues the court erred in accepting the State's application of Rule 
307-4-1, Scope; Rule 307-4-2 Categories; and Rule 307-4-3 Adjustments. 
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Standard of Review 
The trial courts review of "[A]n agency's application of the law to the facts may, 
depending on the issue, be reviewed by an appellate court with varying degrees of strictness, 
falling anywhere between a review for "correctness" and a broad "abuse of discretion" 
standard." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997). In determining the 
level of discretion the Court of Appeals may accord to the agency in such situations, the 
Appeals Court should consider "factors such as policy concerns and an agency's expertise." 
Drake at 181. 
The Appellate Court should review the trial courts acceptance of the State's 
conclusions with respect to R307-4-2 with only moderate deference, e. g. an intermediate 
standard of scrutiny, because the proper application of the Rule "requires little highly 
specialized or technical knowledge that would be uniquely within the Department's 
expertise." Allen v. Department of Employment Sec, 781 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court's acceptance of the State's conclusions with respect to R307-4-1 & 3 are 
conclusions of law to be reviewed by the Appellant Court under a correction of error 
standard with no deference to the agencies decision. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P. 2d 
1281,1285. (Utah App. 1993). 
This issue was preserved for review in Defendant's Proposed Settlement of Penalty 
Amount [Proposed Settlement [PS] Page 2-3, Paragraph 1-6] and in oral argument before 
the trial court. [Transcript of Penalty Hearing [TPH] Page 22-23, 49] 
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4. The trial court erred as a matter of law during the penalty hearing in imposing 
a $23,000.00 fine, pursuant to § 19-2-115 U. C. A., when the Trust had at most $5,000.00 
of equity in the property. 
The $23,000.00 fine imposed by the trial court violates the excessive fines provision 
of the Eighth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
Standard of Review 
Constitutional interpretation is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial courts conclusion State v. Contrel 886 P.2d 107,111 (Utah 
App.1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). See also Financial Bancorp. Inc. v. 
Pingree & Dahle. Inc.. 880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App.1994). 
This issue was preserved for review in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in oral argument 
before the trial court. [PS 3:6] [TPH 3:6] 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The determinative Constitutional Provisions are the Eighth Amendment to the U. S. 
Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution. 
The determinative statutory provisions are Utah Code Ann §63-46b-19(3)(c)(d), 
§ 19-2-115, and Utah Administrative Code, Air Quality Rule 307-4-1, Scope; Rule 307-4-2 
Categories; and Rule 307-4-3 Adjustments. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action arising under Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-101 et seq (1953 as 
amended 1997), the Utah Air Conservation Act, and the Utah Administrative Code, Air 
Quality Rules 307-1-1 et seq., concerning alleged violations of the Act at the Truman 
Apartments, an apartment building that was formally owned by the Trust. [Complaint] 
Ms. Jensen hired two workers to repair a ceiling in the building, instead of repairing 
the ceiling they removed the ceiling. A disgruntled tenant called the State and analysis of the 
ceiling material revealed it contained asbestos. Neither the workmen, nor Ms. Jensen had 
prior knowledge that the ceiling material contained asbestos. 
On or about February 13, 1997, the State issued a Notice of Violation and Order to 
Comply or Cease and Desist. Ms. Jensen received a citation and notification of penalty on 
March 10, 1997. On April 6, 1997, Ms. Jensen then sent a certified letter to Sharleen 
Hansen of the Occupational Safety and Health Division. Ms. Jensen, received a copy of the 
Notice of Violation and Order to Comply or Cease and Desist on April 9, 1997 by certified 
mail. Believing that her letter to Ms. Hansen of April 6, 1997, served as a response to the 
Order and that the Occupational Safety and Health Division and the Utah Division of Air 
Quality were the same agency, Ms. Jensen did not respond to the Order issued by the Board 
The State filed a Complaint in this matter on October 1,1997 seeking to enforce the 
Order that allegedly became final on May 9, 1997. The State filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on March 19, 1998, arguing that there were no factual matters at issue and the 
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only issues before the Court were whether the Board may civilly enforce the final order 
entered against the trust. 
The State contended that Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(l)(a) required that the Trust 
respond to the order within 30 days of its receipt or April 9, 1997 and the trust had not 
presented a viable defense to the action. The Trust responded arguing Jensen did in fact 
request a hearing within thirty days after the issuance of the administrative ruling (notice 
received March 10, 1997, hearing requested April 7, 1997), as required by the 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(l)(a), but the Defendant's 
request was sent to the wrong party, e. g. the Utah Department of Health, instead of the 
Utah Air Quality Board, that the notice was deficient because the Trust did not have 
adequate notice of how to properly respond and although there may have been an 
unknowing violation of the Order, the trust subsequently complied with the order and could 
defend pursuant to Utah Code Ann §63-46b-19(3)(c)(d). 
The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Honorable Judge 
Barrett on September 29,1998. The Court, ignored the material issues of fact presented by 
the Trust, and granted the State's motion based upon the Trust's default for failure to 
respond to the Notice of Violation and Order issued by the State. The Defendant was not 
permitted to assert her defenses as provided by Utah Code Ann §63-46b-19(3)(c)(d), nor 
was she able to have the issue of whether her response was timely heard by the trier of fact. 
The Court held a hearing on the penalty amount and entered a judgment for the State 
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in the amount of $23,000.00. This penalty is nearly 5 times greater than the equity the trust 
held in the property and the Trust contends it violates the excessive fines provision of the 
Eighth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Trust purchased the Truman Apartments in 1996 for approximately 
$210,000.00. The building was sold in 1998 for approximately $238,000.00. The equity the 
Trust held in the building was approximately $5,000.00. [TPH 44:6, 55:7, 19] 
2. The building was built in approximately 1915 and was in poor condition, the 
asbestos ceilings that were the subject of the underlying action had been in place for many 
decades. 
3. Immediately after taking possession of the building the Trust found that it 
needed extensive and costly repairs. [TPH 56:7, 25, 57:1-13] 
4. Ms. Jensen, who receives Social Security Disability payments for a 100% 
mental impairment, attempted to correct the problems with the building as best she could 
considering her condition and the cash flow the apartments generated. [TPH 47:15-22] 
5. Because of the condition of the building, Ms. Jensen began to have problems 
with some of her tenants. [TPH 50:7-17, 52:6-22] 
6. The person who reported the alleged violations to the state was one of the 
problem tenants. [TPH 50:7-17, 52:6-25] 
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7. On or about January 7, 1997 this tenant complained to, among others, the 
Utah Air Quality Board, Environmental Health Division, the State Department of Health, 
the Salt Lake County Health Department, the City of South Salt Lake, and various media 
outlets concerning her perceived violations at the apartments. [TPH 50:7-17] 
8. On or about January 16, 1997, Ms. Jensen asked two workers to repair a hall 
ceiling. [TPH 53:6-25, 54:1-14] 
9. In spite of the Ms. Jensen's specific instructions not to remove the ceiling, the 
workers removed it anyway. It was later determined that the ceiling contained asbestos, 
neither Ms. Jensen nor the workers were aware of this fact. [TPH 48:24-25, ] 
10. On or about January 21, 1997 the same tenant again summoned the DAQ to 
the premises, Ms. Jensen talked Bowen Call of the DAQ and Sharleen Hansen of State of 
Utah Department of Health, and learned for the first time that the material contained 
asbestos. [TPH 49:1-25] 
11. On or about February 13, 1997, the executive secretary issued a Notice of 
Violation and Order to Comply or Cease and Desist. [Complaint] 
12. Ms. Jensen received a citation and notification of penalty on March 10, 
1997.[Plaintiff s Response Exhibit 2] 
13. On April 6, 1997, Ms. Jensen then sent a certified letter to Sharleen Hansen 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Division, in which she requested additional time to 
respond and included a copy of the Asbestos Waste Shipment Record Landfill Receipt 
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showing that wetted asbestos had been received by the Salt Lake Valley landfill on March 
12.1997. [TPH 51:4-25] 
14. Ms. Jensen received a copy of the Notice of Violation and Order to Comply 
or Cease and Desist on April 9, 1997 by certified mail. [Complaint] 
15. Believing that her letter to Ms. Hansen of April 6,1997, served as a response 
to the Order, that the Occupational Safety and Health Division and the Utah Division of Air 
Quality were the same agency, and that she had complied with the Order by properly 
disposing of the asbestos containing material Ms. Jensen did not respond to the Order issued 
by the Board. [TPH 51:4-25] 
16. The State filed the Complaint in this matter on October 1, 1997 seeking to 
enforce the Order that allegedly became final on May 9, 1997. [Complaint] 
17. The Trust was served on December 4, 1997 and answered the Complaint on 
January 26, 1998. 
18. The Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 
19.1998, arguing that there were no factual matters at issue and the only issues before the 
Court were whether the Board may civilly enforce the final order entered against the 
trust.[Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [PMS]4:1] 
19. The State contended that Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(l)(a) required that the 
Trust respond to the order within 30 days of its receipt or April 9,1997 and the trust had not 
presented a viable defense to the action. [PMS 4:1] 
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20. The Trust responded arguing: (1) that Jensen did in fact request a hearing 
within thirty days after the issuance of the administrative ruling (notice received March 10, 
1997, hearing requested April 751997), as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(l)(a), 
but the Defendants request was sent to the wrong party, e. g. the Utah Department of 
Health, instead of the Board; (2) The notice was deficient because the Defendant did not 
have adequate notice of how to properly respond; (3) Although there may have been an 
unknowing violation of the Order, the Defendant subsequently complied with the order, 
arguing that in a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agencies order, in addition to any 
other defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend of the ground that the defendant has 
not violated the order or has violated the order but had subsequently complied, Utah Code 
Ann §63-46b-19(3)(c)(d). [DMSO 3-5] 
21. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Honorable 
Judge Barrett on September 29, 1998. [TSJ 1] 
22. The Court, ignored the material issues of fact presented by the Trust, and 
granted the State's motion based upon the Trust's default for failure to respond to the Notice 
of Violation and Order issued by the State. [TSJ 8:17-25, 9: 1-2] 
23. The Defendant was not permitted to assert her defenses as provided by Utah 
Code Ann §63-46b-19(3)(c)(d), nor was she able to have the issue of whether her response 
was timely heard by the trier of fact. [TSJ 7:25, 8:1-2, 17] 
24. The Court requested that the parties attempt to stipulate to a penalty. Counsel 
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for the parties met on October 1, 1998. The State presented the Trust with its proposed 
settlement in the amount of $23,000.00 which the Defendant rejected. 
25. The Court held a hearing on the penalty amount on October 16, 1998 and 
entered a judgment for the State in the amount of $23,000.00. [TPH 62:20-25] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the State's motion for Summary 
Judgment without allowing the trust the opportunity to defend on the basis that the Trust had 
not violated the order or that the Trust had violated the order but subsequently complied, as 
provided by Utah Code Ann §63-46b-19(3)(c)&(d). 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Factual issues exist as to the 
adequacy and sufficiency of the notice and as to whether the trust had in fact requested a 
hearing precluding summary judgment. 
The trail court erred by accepting the Bureau of Air Quality's recommendation of a 
$23,000.00 penalty. A penalty in the amount of $23,000.00, which is nearly five times the 
Trust's equity in the property, violates the Excessive Fines provisions of the United States 
and Utah Constitution. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WITHOUT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO PRESENT 
DEFENSES AS PROVIDED BY UTAH CODE ANN §63-46B-
19(3)(C)(D). 
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of statutory law 
is correction of error. Ong Int'l (TJ.S.AA Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,455 (Utah 
1993). 
The State brought this action in the district court as provided by the Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-19(l)(a)1 to enforce the order issued by the 
Bureau of Air Quality that allegedly became final on May 19,1997. In addition to providing 
for an enforcement mechanism, the statute also provides that in addition to any other 
defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend of the ground that the defendant has not 
violated the order or has violated the order but has subsequently complied2. (Emphasis 
1
 In addition to other enforcement remedies provided by law, an agency may seek 
enforcement of an order by seeking civil enforcement in the district courts. Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-19(l)(a). 
2 
In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's order, in addition to any other 
defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground that: 
( . . . ) 
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or 
(d) the defendant violated the order but subsequently complied. 
12 
added) 
The language of the statute is clear and as the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "When 
interpreting statutes, this court is guided by the long-standing rule that a statute should be 
construed according to its plain language." Utah Sign Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 896 P.2d 
632,633-34 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). Accord Brinkerhoffv. Forsvth. 779 P.2d 685, 
686 (Utah 1989); Brendle v. City of Draper. 937 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah App.1997); See 
also Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988) ("A fundamental 
principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous language in the statute itself may not 
be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning."). The trial court should have allowed 
the Trust to present the additional defenses specifically provided for in the statute. 
There are few Utah cases that deal with the application of the statute and in particular 
the additional defenses allowed by the statute. The Utah Supreme Court in Career Service 
Review Bd. v. Utah Dept. of Corrections. 942 P.2d. 933, 940 (Utah 1997), held that Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-19, does not create a loophole in the doctrine of collateral estoppel to 
permit defendants to resurrect issues in an enforcement action that were decided and put to 
rest in previous administrative proceedings between the parties. 
The facts in Career Service, are distinguishable from the facts in the present action. 
The Trust was not attempting to resurrect issues that were put to rest in a previous action, 
the Trust was attempting to raise the defenses it statutorily entitled to assert. In Career 
Service, the defendant failed to appeal a final order modifying a previous order of the review 
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board. The parties had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issues and unlike the 
situation in this case, the parties were represented by counsel and the defendant did not 
claim to have received inadequate notice or having been denied the opportunity to respond. 
Although a collateral attack on the issues that were adjudicated in an administrative 
action and were not timely appealed, are not allowed by law, and do not fall within §63-
46b-19(3) the Trust's defenses are allowed. A plain reading of the statute compels the 
conclusion that a defendant, disputing the validity of the order and asserting that the order 
has been complied with, is not making a impermissible collateral attack on the order and she 
should have been heard by the trial court. 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-19(3) specifically allows the defendant in an 
enforcement action to defend on the grounds that the defendant has not violated the order; 
or that the defendant violated the order but has subsequently complied. The trial court's 
grant of summary judgment without allowing the Trust to assert its defenses as provided by 
the statute is erroneous as a matter of law. This Court should, therefore, reverse the summary 
judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHERE THERE WERE DISPUTED FACTS AS TO 
WHETHER THE TRUST RECEIVED ADEQUATE NOTICE. 
WHETHER THE NOTICE WAS PROPER, AND WHETHER THE 
NOTICE WAS COMPLIED WITH. 
This case presented the trial court with a mixed question of law and fact that 
requires this Court to review the trial court's application of statutory law to findings of facts. 
Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,424 (Utah 1991). Questions of fact are reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard, with deference given to the trial court. Id. at 425 The trial court's 
application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 937 (Utah 1994). It is well-established law that a trial court may properly grant 
summary judgment only in the absence of genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment on the undisputed facts as a matter of law. Glencore, Ltd. v. 
Ince, 343 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,10 (Utah 1998). The appellate court addresses (1) whether the 
trial court erred in applying the governing law and (2) whether the trial court correctly held 
that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Glencore at 10. 
The only legal issue the trial court considered before granting summary judgment was 
whether the Order became final. The trial court found the notice was sufficient and granted 
summary judgment without allowing the Trust to present its additional defenses as noted 
above. 
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The Trust attempted to argue that Ms. Jensen had not received adequate notice of the 
Order or alternatively the notice was insufficient. If adequate notice and an opportunity to 
be heard are not given, the proceedings are void and those not properly notified are not 
bound by the proceedings because the giving of such notice is jurisdictional. Salt Lake 
County v. Murray City Redevelopment 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). 
Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are 
the very heart of procedural fairness. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1211 (Utah 1983). 
The notice must advise the parties of the specific issues which they must prepare to meet and 
it must be of such a nature as to reasonably convey the required information, and it must 
afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. Ellison, Inc. v. Board 
ofReview, 749 P.2d 1280,1284 (Utah App. 1988) Where notice is ambiguous or inadequate 
to inform a party of the nature of the proceedings against him or her, a party is deprived of 
due process. Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212. 
A question of fact exists as to whether Ms. Jensen did in fact request a hearing 
within thirty days after the issuance of the administrative ruling as required by Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12( 1 )(a). A mixed question of law and fact exists as to whether the notice was 
sufficient given the fact Ms. Jensen was besieged by a myriad of officials from various State 
agencies, local and county government and the Federal government. In light of this massive 
governmental onslaught there is a factual issues of whether the notice adequately informed 
Ms. Jensen. 
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Ms. Jensen raised factual issues as to the adequacy and sufficiency of the notice and 
as to whether the trust had in fact requested a hearing. The trial court's grant of summary 
judgment despite the existence of these material issues of fact was erroneous as a matter of 
law. This Court should, therefore, reverse the summary judgment and remand to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW DURING THE 
PENALTY HEARING IN ACCEPTING THE STATE'S 
APPLICATION OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, RULE 
307-4-1, SCOPE: RULE 307-4-2 CATEGORIES: AND RULE 307-4-3 
ADJUSTMENTS. 
[A]n agency's application of the law to the facts may, depending on the issue, be 
reviewed by an appellate court with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between 
a review for "correctness" and a broad "abuse of discretion" standard." Drake v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). In determining the level of discretion the Court 
of Appeals may accord to the agency in such situations, the Appeals Court should consider 
"factors such as policy concerns and an agency's expertise." Drake at 181. 
The Appellate Court should review the trial court's acceptance of State's conclusions 
with respect to R307-4-2 with only moderate deference, e. g. an intermediate standard of 
scrutiny, because the proper application of the Rule "requires little highly specialized or 
technical knowledge that would be uniquely within the Department's expertise." Allen v. 
Department of Employment Sec. 781 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah App.1989). 
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The trial court's acceptance of the State's conclusions with respect to R307-4-1 & 
3 are conclusions of law to be reviewed by the Appellant Court under a correction of error 
standard with no deference to the agencies decision. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P. 2d 
1281,1285. (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court misapplied the standards, under R. 307-4-2, for the Category of the 
alleged violations, assigning Category A & B to the violations, the violations alleged should 
have been characterized as no more serious than Catagory C. The DAQ by institutional 
custom does not generally ever assess fines based on Catagory C or D. [TPH 9:13-15]. 
The DAQ failed to consider adjustments as provided by R. 307-4-3 wherein the 
amount of the penalty may be adjusted and/or suspended in part based upon: The good faith 
efforts of the Defendants to comply; the failure of the Division to prove wilful or negligent 
actions on the part of the Defendants; the fact that there is no history of noncompliance on 
the part of the Defendants; there has been no economic benefit to the Defendants for 
noncompliance; and the fact that the Defendants do not have the ability to pay the proposed 
penalty. 
There is a factual issues as to whether the State properly considered the good faith 
efforts of the Trust to comply as provided by R. 307-4-3. The State through the testimony 
of Bo Call, [TPH 10:11-25,11:1-3], asserts Ms. Jensen did not make any good-faith efforts 
to comply and the penalty was adjusted upwards as a result. [TPH 17:11-12]. The trial court 
ruled that Ms. Jensen counsel could not cross examine Call on the basis of his opinion that 
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Ms. Jensen had not acted in good faith, rather the trial court ruled Call could only be cross 
examined at what his employer did, what the Utah Air Quality Board did, what he did as 
an employee. [TPH 22:19-25, 23:1-21]. Ms. Jensen maintains she did act in good faith. 
[TPH 49:1-25]. Additionally, Ms. Jensen's mental condition was not considered in the 
analysis of her good faith efforts to comply or her ability to pay. 
Ms. Jensen raised legal and factual issues as to the category to which the alleged 
violations should be assigned and the good faith efforts Ms. Jensen made to comply, in light 
of her mental condition and the surrounding circumstances. The trial court's grant of 
summary judgment despite the existence of the legal issues and material issues of fact was 
erroneous as a matter of law. This Court should, therefore, reverse the summary judgment 
and remand to the trial court for further proceedings 
POINT IV. 
THE $23.000.00 FINE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATES 
THE EXCESSIVE FINES PROVISION OF THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE U. S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE L 
SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Constitutional interpretation is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's conclusion .State v. Contrel 886 P.2d 107,111 (Utah 
App.1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
This case involves a civil penalty imposed by the State of Utah pursuant to U. C. A. 
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§ 19-2-115. The United States Supreme Court has stated, "Civil penalties are designed as 
a rough form of 'liquidated damages' for the harms suffered by the Government as a result 
of a defendant's conduct." Rex Trailer Co. v. United States 350 U. S. 148,153-154(1956). 
In Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 603 (1993), a case decided solely under the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Court articulated a categorical approach in 
analyzing whether a fine is Constitutionally excessive. The first step of this analysis is 
whether the fine constitutes punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. It is well 
established that a civil remedy does not rise to the level of punishment merely because the 
remedy provides for a recovery in excess of the Government's actual damages. United States 
v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 442. However, even a cursory reading of § 19-2-115 reveals its 
punitive nature. A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial 
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent 
purposes, is punishment. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Even if criminal 
fines, civil penalties, or civil forfeitures have remedial purposes, if they have any punitive 
objectives, they are subject to constitutional constraints. Utah Code Annotated § 19-2-115 
is clearly punitive in nature. 
The second step of the Austin analysis is whether the particular sanction in question 
is so large as to be excessive. Austin 509 U. S. at 622-623. The imposition of a $23,000.00 
fine is clearly excessive. 
The trial court failed to inquire into, or establish the harm, if any, the state suffered 
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as a result of the alleged violations. The Trust objected to the fine arguing the $23,000.00 
was an excessive fine. [TPH 6: 14-17]. 
The trial court noted that "$23,000.00 was a lot of money" but it did not rule on the 
Trust's excessive fines objection nor make findings of fact to support the harm the State may 
have suffered as a result of the alleged violations. The Utah Supreme Court noted in Butler, 
Crockett & Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909P.2d225, 
231 (Utah 1995) that trial courts may not decline to rule on issues properly presented for 
decision. The trial court's observation that $23,000, is a lot of money, to the extent that it 
was a ruling on the Trust's objection under the excessive fines clause, was not supported by 
findings of fact showing the harm suffered by the State. 
The failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment. See Butler 909 P.2d at 231. The trial court did not make 
findings on the excessiveness of the fine when the Trust's objection had been entered. The 
facts on the record are neither clear, uncontroverted nor capable of supporting the $23,000 
judgment when there is no indication whatsoever as to the value of the harm the State had 
suffered as a result of the alleged violations. 
U. C. A. § 19-2-115 is punitive and subject to the constitutional constraints imposed 
by the Eighth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah State 
Constitution. The trial courts imposition of the $23,000 fine once the Trust's objection had 
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been made withoi it findings to suppoi t tl le fine is ei roi leous as a i natter of law7. This Coi irt 
should, therefore, reverse the summary judgment and remand to the trial com t for further 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
1 1 le trial • ::oi n t erred as a i i lattei of la v ( : by i: efi isil lg to alio *v Ms Jei lsei 1 tl le 
opportunity to present her defenses in the enforcement action, and in imposing the 
$23,000.00 fine in contravention of the Excessive Fines provisions of the United States and 
Utah State Constitution. Material issues of fact exist regarding the adequacy and sufficiency 
of the i lotice am: id the good faith efforts ]\ Is Jei lsei l i i lade to comply w itl I tl le i lotice. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's rulings and remand this action for 
further proceedings. 
itf> 
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